

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
STATESBORO DIVISION**

RONNIE SANKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN ROBERT TOOLE; CHRONIC CARE DR. (UNKNOWN); and DENTIST (UNKNOWN),

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:15-cv-146

**ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Rogers State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, filed this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to contest certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia. For the reasons which follow, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities. I also **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Toole and Chronic Care Doctor. The Court **DIRECTS** the United States Marshal to serve Defendant Dentist with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and this Order.

In addition, the Court **VACATES** its March 2, 2016, Report and Recommendation, (doc. 10), concerning the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint based on what appeared to be Plaintiff's failure to follow an Order of the Court and failure to prosecute his case. The basis for the recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint was that Plaintiff had transferred to another penal institution and had not advised the Court of his transfer and resultant new mailing address.

(Doc. 10, p. 1–2.) However, Plaintiff later wrote letters to the Court, informing it that he is still housed at Rogers State Prison but has not been receiving his mailings from this Court. (Docs. 11, 12.)

Further, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 3.) As set forth below, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion.

## **BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff asserts he was diagnosed as HIV positive in August 2013 while he was housed at Coastal State Prison. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends he had several rotten, infected teeth pulled while he was housed at Coastal State Prison because the HIV doctor in Augusta informed him these teeth could affect his immune system. At the time he was transferred to Georgia State Prison in November 2013, Plaintiff maintains he still had two rotten, infected teeth, one of which had an abscess, which had not been pulled. (*Id.*) Plaintiff alleges he immediately filled out a sick call request upon his arrival at Georgia State Prison to have those two teeth pulled. Plaintiff states he has cancelled sick call request slips from November 2013 through January 2015, and he did not have these teeth pulled. Plaintiff contends he wrote a letter to Defendant Toole, the Warden, and other administrative personnel to explain his problems, yet no one responded to him. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff avers he began having feelings of depression in November 2014 and told Defendant “Chronic Care Doctor”, who had some of Plaintiff’s blood drawn. (*Id.* at p. 5.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Doctor must have seen “something” in Plaintiff’s blood because Plaintiff went to Augusta in December 2014 to see the HIV doctor. (*Id.*) According to Plaintiff, the HIV doctor observed that his viral load and CD4 cell count had changed dramatically, and Plaintiff told the doctor that he still had not gotten those two teeth pulled. Plaintiff contends the

doctor informed him those teeth needed to be pulled as soon as possible before his immune system worsened. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also contends that the doctor told him that the medication he was taking for his HIV was working so well that his HIV was not detected, but he had to stop taking that medication because his body started to reject the medication, possibly due to the infections in his teeth.<sup>1</sup>

### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action *in forma pauperis* under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

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<sup>1</sup> As an aside, Plaintiff mentions that the “administration” would not place him in protective custody after he informed them that the “GD’s” gang had threatened him. (*Id.* at pp. 6–7.) Based on Plaintiff’s requested relief, he does not seek to pursue any putative failure to protect claim in this cause of action. This is just as well, since any failure to protect claim would be unrelated to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Smith v. Owens, No. 14-14039, 2015 WL 4281241, at \*4 (11th Cir. July 16, 2015) (upholding this Court’s dismissal of unrelated claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), which will allow the joinder of claims if the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“*Pro se* pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350

F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). The requisite review of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises several doctrines of law, which the Court discusses in turn.

## DISCUSSION

### I. **Claims for Monetary Damages Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities**

Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. States are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999). Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit without its consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a lawsuit against a state officer in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the [s]tate itself,” such a defendant is immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit against Defendants in their official capacities as employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes these actors from suit in their official capacities. See Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity, Plaintiff cannot sustain any constitutional claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief. The Court should **DISMISS** these claims.

## **II. Claims Against Defendant Toole**

Section 1983 liability must be based on something more than a defendant's supervisory position or a theory of respondeat superior.<sup>2</sup> Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802. "To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct." Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011).

It appears Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Toole liable based solely on his position as Warden at Georgia State Prison. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Toole personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations. In fact, the only assertion Plaintiff makes against Defendant Toole is that he wrote him a letter telling him about Plaintiff's dental issues, and Defendant Toole did nothing to help him. This is an insufficient basis for liability under Section 1983. See Allen v. Brown, No. CV 112-052, 2013 WL 1333175, at \* 5 n.9 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting that, even assuming a prisoner-plaintiff alleged the filing of a grievance with supervisory officials put the officials on notice of alleged constitutional violations, he still could not proceed against the supervisors on this basis because plaintiff did

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<sup>2</sup> The principle that respondeat superior is not a cognizable theory of liability under Section 1983 holds true regardless of whether the entity sued is a state, municipality, or private corporation. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129–30 (11th Cir. 1992).

not state the supervisors personally participated in the violations or that there was a causal connection between the alleged violations and the supervisors' actions) (citing Asad v. Crosby, 158 F. App'x 166, 170–72 (11th Cir. 2005), and Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Weems v. St. Lawrence, No. CV 409-065, 2009 WL 2422795, at \* 4 n.7 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2009) (finding that plaintiff's assertion that he sent grievances and letters to ranking officers was not enough to establish any direct participation in alleged constitutional violations on the part of those ranking officials). The Court should **DISMISS** Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Toole.

### **III. Deliberate Indifference Claims**

The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials including the duty to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). This right to safety is violated when a defendant shows a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). In order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him; (2) defendant showed a deliberate indifference to this risk; and (3) there is a causal connection between the defendant's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.

In the medical care context, the standard for cruel and unusual punishment, embodied in the principles expressed in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), is whether a prison official exhibits a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. However, “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Rather, “an inmate must allege acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994).

In order to prove a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must overcome three obstacles. The prisoner must: (1) “satisfy the objective component by showing that [he] had a serious medical need”; (2) “satisfy the subjective component by showing that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical need”; and (3) “show that the injury was caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). A medical need is serious if it “‘has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or [is] one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187). As for the subjective component, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently required that “a defendant know of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety.” Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir. 1995). Under the subjective prong, an inmate “must prove three things: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.

“The meaning of ‘more than gross negligence’ is not self-evident[.]” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. “When the claim turns on the quality of the treatment provided, there is no constitutional violation as long as the medical care provided to the inmate is ‘minimally adequate.’” Blanchard v. White Cty. Det. Ctr. Staff, 262 F. App’x 959, 964 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris, 941 F.2d at 1504). “Deliberate indifference is not established where an inmate received care but desired different modes of treatment.” Id.

#### **A. Claims Against Defendant Chronic Care Doctor**

Plaintiff fails to set forth a viable deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Chronic Care Doctor. The only allegation Plaintiff levies against this Defendant is that he informed the Chronic Care Doctor of his feelings of depression. In response, the Chronic Care Doctor had Plaintiff's blood drawn, and whatever the Chronic Care Doctor saw on any tests he may have run resulted in Plaintiff being sent to the HIV doctor in Augusta the next month. Plaintiff does not set forth sufficient facts for a deliberate difference claim against Defendant Chronic Care Doctor. Thus, the Court should **DISMISS** Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant.

#### **B. Claims Against Defendant Dentist**

To prove a delay in providing medical treatment caused harm, a plaintiff must present evidence of: ““(1) the seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether the delay worsened the medical condition; and (3) the reason for the delay.”” Keele v. Glynn Cty., Ga., 938 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1292 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327). However, ““accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, [and] medical malpractice”” are insufficient to sustain a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nimmons v. Aviles, 409 F. App’x 295, 297 (11th Cir. 2011)). In addition, a plaintiff who asserts that a delay in obtaining medical treatment amounts to a constitutional violation is required to submit verifying medical evidence into the record “to establish the detrimental effect of [any] delay in medical treatment to succeed.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 458–59 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff contends that he has two teeth which are infected, and if these teeth are not pulled, he could suffer deleterious effects to his immune system since he is HIV positive. Plaintiff also contends he has made numerous sick call requests to have these teeth removed, yet

he still has not received this treatment. Plaintiff arguably sets forth a claim that he has a serious medical need, and the delay in receiving treatment for that need could cause an exacerbation of his already existing condition. Accordingly, Plaintiff sets forth a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Dentist.

#### **IV. Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief**

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, p. 11.) To be entitled to a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, the movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) an injunction or protective order is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction or protective order would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the injunction or protective order would not be adverse to the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005). In this Circuit, an “injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.” Horton v. City of Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).

If a plaintiff succeeds in making such a showing, then “the court may grant injunctive relief, but the relief must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.” Newman v. Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, where there is a constitutional violation in the prison context, courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere with prison administration and discipline, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”), *overruled on other grounds by* Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In such cases, “[d]eference to

prison authorities is especially appropriate.” Newman, 683 F.2d at 1320–21 (reversing district court’s injunction requiring release of prisoners on probation because it “involved the court in the operation of the State’s system of criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary” and less intrusive equitable remedy was available).

Plaintiff has not shown that he has satisfied the prerequisites in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiff has not shown the likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. This is not to say that Plaintiff will not be able to ultimately obtain some form of injunctive relief in this case. However, he has not made the requisite showing at this time to obtain the extraordinary relief he currently seeks. Therefore, the Court should **DENY** his request for a preliminary injunction.

#### **V. Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3)**

Plaintiff seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him in this case. In this civil case, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App’x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a civil case is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “the key” to assessing whether counsel should be appointed “is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or

her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need such help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).

The Court has reviewed the record and pleadings in this case and finds no “exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel. While the Court understands that Plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found that “prisoners do not receive special consideration notwithstanding the challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated.” Hampton v. Peeples, No. CV 614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at \*2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). “Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts’ decisions to refuse appointment of counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this case for want of exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015); Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 702 (11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App’x at 457; Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 414 (11th Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096; Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). This case is not so complex legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting “the essential merits of his position” to the Court. Plaintiff’s Motion is **DENIED**.

## CONCLUSION

For the numerous reasons set forth above, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS** all monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities and all claims against Defendants Toole and Chronic Care Doctor. I also **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DENY** Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court **DENIES** Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

The Court **ORDERS** any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.

## **REMAINING CLAIM AND DEFENDANT**

Plaintiff's allegations in his Complaint arguably state a colorable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Dentist. Consequently, a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and a copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendant Dentist by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. The Court also provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the remainder of this action and which the Court urges the parties to read and follow.

The Court notes that Plaintiff identifies Defendant Dentist as being in service at Georgia State Prison from 2013 to 2015, indicating that this Defendant is no longer employed at Georgia State Prison. The Court **ORDERS** the United States Marshal to make reasonable efforts to locate this Defendant Dentist so that he may be served with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. This is not to say Plaintiff is relieved from his obligation to prosecute his cause of action. Rather, this Order only speaks to the inherent constraints placed on prisoner-plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff here, in attempting to garner personal information regarding named defendants who are or were employed by the Georgia Department of Corrections. Plaintiff is advised he, too, should also make reasonable efforts to locate Defendant Dentist so that this Defendant may be served with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff is forewarned that the lack of service upon Defendant Dentist—even through no fault of his own—may result in the dismissal of his claims against this Defendant.

### **INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANT**

Because Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, the undersigned directs that the United States Marshal effect service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendant by first-class mail and request that the Defendant waive

formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.7. Individual and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Defendant is hereby granted leave of court to take the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Defendant is further advised that the Court's standard 140 day discovery period will commence upon the filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Defendant shall ensure that all discovery, including the Plaintiff's deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that discovery period.

In the event that Defendant takes the deposition of any other person, Defendant is ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As the Plaintiff will likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, Defendant shall notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on Defendant, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10) days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. Defendant shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c).

## **INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF**

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon his attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendant or his counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. “Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and] the file number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).

Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this Court and defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this case.

Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to obtain facts and information about the case from Defendant, Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, *et seq.* The discovery period in this case will expire 140 days after the filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the Court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within this time period. Local Rule 26.1. Discovery materials should **not** be filed routinely with the Clerk of Court; exceptions include: when the Court directs filing; when a party needs such materials in connection with a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary; and when needed for use at trial. Local Rule 26.4.

Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes

of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or organizations who are not named as Defendant. Interrogatories are not to contain more than twenty-five (25) questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the Court. If Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he should first contact the attorney for Defendant and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2)(A); Local Rule 26.7.

Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard cost of fifty cents (\$.50) per page. **If Plaintiff seeks copies, he should request them directly from the Clerk of Court and is advised that the Court will authorize and require the collection of fees from his prison trust fund account to pay the cost of the copies at the aforementioned rate of fifty cents (\$.50) per page.**

If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of prosecution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Local Rule 41.1.

It is Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by Defendant. Upon no less than five (5) days' notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses

to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including  
dismissal of this case.

As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to “counsel of record” directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which may be scheduled by the Court.

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING  
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Under this Court’s Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. “Failure to respond shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion.” Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that he does not oppose the Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution if Plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact set forth in the Defendant’s statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by an opposition statement. Should Defendant file a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff is advised that he will have the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, Plaintiff must file counter-affidavits if he desires to contest the Defendant's statement of the facts. Should Plaintiff fail to file opposing affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, any factual assertions made in Defendant's affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment may be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

**SO ORDERED** and **REPORTED** and **RECOMMENDED**, this 16th day of May, 2016.



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R. STAN BAKER  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA